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ABSTRACT
Economies respond differently to aggregate shocks that reduce output. While some countries rapidly recover
their pre-crisis trend, others stagnate. Recent studies provide empirical support for a link between aggregate
growth and plant dynamics through its effect on productivity: the entry and exit of firms and the reallocation
of resources from less to more efficient firms explain a relevant part of transitional productivity dynamics.
In this paper we use a stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms to study the effect on
aggregate short-run growth of policies that distort the process of birth, growth and death of firms, as well as
the reallocation of resources across economic units. Our findings show that indeed policies that alter plant
dynamics can explain slow recoveries. We also find that output losses associated to delayed recoveries are
large.
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1. Introduction
Why do some countries recover with relative ease from negative shocks while others
suffer considerably?  Exogenous shocks like the deterioration in terms of trade, the reduction in
foreign capital flows, and the rise in international interest rates are common to many developing
countries. Although these shocks initially produce a similar fall in economic activity, the recovery
paths in their aftermath differ markedly across countries.  This is, for instance, what Bergoeing et
al. (2002) find when they compare the experiences of Mexico and Chile in the 1980s.  Being
affected by similar shocks in the onset of the 1980s debt crisis, Chile was able to recover and
“find” a decade that turned out to be lost for Mexico and most of Latin America.  Bergoeing et al.
argue that a key element in Chile’s ability to recover was a bankruptcy law that facilitated the
retrenchment of weak firms and creation of stronger companies.
Recovery processes are intrinsically costly, as they require significant amounts of
resource reallocation.  Depending on the type and intensity of shocks, some firms and sectors in
the economy contract while others expand. Labor and capital resources are freed by declining
firms in order to be used by growing ones, but not without difficulty. Resource reallocation
implies adjustment, and this is costly whether it means the adoption of new technologies and
more capital utilization by expanding firms or the shredding of labor and capital, even to the point
of disappearance, by weakening firms.  Without this costly process, however, economies would
be unable to resume full economic activity in the aftermath of shocks.
The main hypothesis of this paper is that slow and costly recoveries are the result of
impediments to the natural process of resource reallocation.  Some of these impediments are
inherent to the adjustment process and, thus, can be considered as natural transaction costs (see
Caballero and Hammour 1998a).  However, these impediments can also result from government
policy interventions, such as excessive labor protection, directed credit to inefficient sectors,
entry barriers to the establishment of new plants and firms, and burdensome bankruptcy laws.  By
reducing the extent of restructuring, these obstacles alter the recovery path that follows aggregate
shocks, inducing the stagnation of economic activity during long periods of time.
Recent studies have underscored the connection between rigidities and recovery. Prescott
(2002) provides a comprehensive analysis of this link, making clear that this is an important issue
not only for developing countries but also for developed economies. The U.S. depression of the
1930s had many causes, but it is now clear that policy distortions exacerbated the slowdown.  For
instance, Cole and Ohanian (1999) argue that labor market regulations stalled the recovery
process in the aftermath of the stock market crash.
More recently, Germany and Japan, the second and third largest economies in the world,
have experienced their worst recessions since the end of World War II.  Germany’s GDP growth
rate has been half as that in the rest of Europe over the last ten years, with the costs of
reunification playing only a limited role in the country’s stagnation.  As Broadbent, Schumacher,
and Schels (2004) argue, the subsidized interest rates prevalent in Germany in the 1990s led to
overinvestment and low capital returns.  After the European Commissioned dictated in 2001 that
public guarantees for state banks should be eliminated, the interest rates paid by German firms
started to rise, which prompted the need for massive firm restructuring.  However, the process has
been slow and painful mostly due to Germany’s sclerotic labor markets and, as result, the
country’s economy has been stagnant in the first years of this decade.  Japan’s experience has
been worse.  Its economy has barely grown in the last ten years due to a combination of overly3
conservative monetary policy and mounting debts by Japanese firms.  As Hoshi and Kashyap
(2004), Hayashi and Prescott (2002), and Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2003) argue, it is not
firms’ debt what explains their inability to recover but the support that Japanese banks have given
to grossly underperforming firms (or “zombies”, as they have come to be known). The life
support given by mostly insolvent Japanese banks to “zombie” firms can only be explained by a
regulatory regime that allows public recapitalization of weak banks and provides overly generous
deposit and even creditor and shareholder insurance.  Only the shredding of underperforming
firms could free the financial and other resources needed by profitable firms to grow and lead the
recovery of Japan’s economy.
Beyond these country-case examples, in Section 2 of the paper we present some cross-
country evidence that there is a negative relationship between the burden of the regulatory
environment and the economy’s ability to recover from shocks.  In a sample of 76 countries with
average data for the 1990s, we find that countries that impose heavier restrictions on product and
factor markets (i.e., firm entry, financial transactions, international trade, bankruptcy procedures,
bureaucratic red tape, taxation, and labor markets) suffer from more severe --deep and prolonged-
- recessions.  This evidence serves mostly as motivation for the theoretical analysis that is the
focus of the study.
This paper analyzes how policy-induced rigidities can impair the economy’s ability to
absorb and accommodate shocks, producing a more painful and protracted recovery.  This is a
macroeconomic issue, but it can be properly analyzed only from a microeconomic standpoint.
The reason is that policy-induced rigidities affect the dynamics of creation, growth, and
destruction of investment projects and firms in a heterogeneous, idiosyncratic manner, even if the
shocks are common.  Depending on each firm’s capital intensity, level of technology, and specific
shocks, policy-induced distortions become relevant for some firms and less so for others in the
face of common adverse conditions.  It is this heterogeneity in firms’ responses to shocks what
allows us to discern the mechanisms through which rigidities operate.
In order to model the link between slow recoveries and rigidities, we extend the work of
Campbell (1998) to allow for policy-induced obstacles to restructuring.  Specifically, we develop
a dynamic general equilibrium model of heterogeneous plants subject to aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks and rigidities. We model these rigidities as subsidies and taxes that change
the relative cost of firm creation, expansion, and survival, thus altering the natural rate of factor
reallocation. We then submit the modeled economy to aggregate shocks and compare the
recovery path of a distorted economy to that of a fully flexible one.
Ours is a vintage capital model, where different types of capital embody different levels
of technology. As the technological frontier expands, capital that represents less advanced
technologies will tend to be scrapped. Its salvage value can then be used to produce new capital
that embodies the leading-edge technology. In this context, the economy's equilibrium path is
characterized by an ongoing process of resource reallocation. When an exogenous rigidity is
introduced, such as a production subsidy to incumbent firms, the natural process of entry and exit
is muted, reducing the amount of firm restructuring. In this example, the subsidy allows
inefficient plants --which would have otherwise exited-- to stay longer in business, and prevents
new and more technologically advanced plants to appear. This promotes an inefficient allocation
of resources and pushes the economy inside its production possibilities frontier.  We believe these
explanations for the lack of recovery and growth apply to a wide range of actual economic
experiences.4
After presenting the model, we simulate two situations representing particular cases of
impediments to reallocation with the purpose of showing how they may affect the economy’s
recovery path.  In the first numerical exercise, we compare economies that start off with different
levels of a production subsidy to incumbent firms. We expose these economies to the same
aggregate shock and then compare their recovery paths. Under our benchmark calibration, we
find that an undistorted economy that faces a (one-period) transitory aggregate shock equivalent
to 5% of steady-state per capita GDP loses about 13% of its pre-shock output and completes
restructuring in a period of one quarter. However, in the presence of a similar shock, an economy
that starts off with a 5% (10%) subsidy to incumbents loses 14.2% (14.3%) of initial output with
a restructuring period of 9 (10) quarters.
In our second exercise, the distortion is a policy response to the aggregate shock. When
an exogenous recession hits the economy, jobs are lost and production units are scrapped. To
reduce the distress associated to these losses, the government intervenes subsidizing incumbents
one period after the shock hits the economy. This intervention is transitory and phased out
gradually, lasting about 3 quarters in the simulation. In this case, an economy that initially
imposes a 3% (6%) subsidy to incumbents loses about 24% (36%) of GDP in present value terms
with a recovery period that lasts 29 (37) periods. The differences in recovery paths with respect to
the fully flexible economy are remarkable, particularly given that we assume that shocks are
short-lived and that there is a single distortion present.
Our work builds on the firm heterogeneity models pioneered by Jovanovic (1982) and
further extended by Hopenhayn (1992), Ericson and Pakes (1995), and Campbell (1998). This
paper complements the analysis started by Caballero and Hammour (1998a). In a series of papers,
Caballero and Hammour develop a model of inefficient creative destruction, in which
transactional difficulties hamper the process of reallocation. They find that in these economies the
processes of firm creation and destruction are decoupled and their rates are inefficiently low.  Our
analysis differs Caballero and Hammour’s in that in our model rigidities are the result of direct
policy interventions. Moreover, we focus on the creation and destruction margins, not attempting
to explain the “scrambling” of production units according to their level of efficiency.  Our work
also complements the studies that analyze the level effects of policy distortions in the context of
firm dynamics.  Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) build a model of firm heterogeneity to study the
effects of a tax on layoffs. They find large employment and welfare effects on the economy’s
stationary equilibrium.  Similarly, Restuccia and Rogerson (2003) develop a model of firm
heterogeneity to show that policies that distort the relative prices faced by individual firms can
result in large productivity losses. They use the model to help explain the large differences in
aggregate output per capita across countries. Our model is complementary to these analyses
because, rather than focusing on levels in the steady state, we compare the trajectories of recovery
from shocks as represented by transitional dynamics.
Finally, our work is also related to the job reallocation and plant dynamics literature.
Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) and others have extensively documented the international
evidence on job reallocation. At any given time, and even within the same industry, jobs are
created and destroyed, existing plants expand and contract, new plants start up, and old plants
shut down.  Given that developing countries face larger shocks, thus requiring higher levels of
restructuring than industrialized economies, we should then observe higher rates of reallocation in
developing economies.  However, the facts documented in the literature show surprisingly similar
rates of job reallocation across countries. One reading of this evidence is that some developing
economies face severe obstacles, whether structural or policy-induced, to reshuffle resources
across production units.  Caballero, Engel and Micco (2003) reach a similar conclusion after5
comparing the degree of labor market inflexibility in several Latin American, finding for instance
that Mexico faces more rigidities than Chile.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section provides some cross-country
empirical support for a link between the regulatory environment and the severity of recessions.  In
Section 3 we present a model with heterogeneous plants and policy distortions. We explain the
mechanics of the model and describe its equilibrium solution. In Section 4 we calibrate and
simulate our model economy to quantify the impact of policy distortions on slow recoveries.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Some Empirical Evidence
Our goal is to understand why some countries suffer to recover from temporary
negative shocks. To this macroeconomic question, we postulate a microeconomic answer
related to the negative effect that distortionary government-imposed regulations have on
firm dynamics. That is, an excessive regulatory environment can weaken the process of
destruction of inefficient investment projects and the adoption of improved technologies.
Given the crucial role that regulations play in our explanation, a necessary first-step is to
examine whether the regulatory environment is in practice related to the severity of
recessions. Here we illustrate the relevance of this relationship from a cross-country
perspective.
The regulatory environment affects the entry, growth, and exit of firms and
investment projects. According to this criterion we can identify and attempt to measure
the most relevant aspects of the regulatory regime.  Using a variety of cross-country
sources, we collected comparable data on the following types of government-imposed
regulations in each country for the 1990s: financial restrictions, trade barriers, firm entry
costs, inefficient bankruptcy procedures, bureaucratic red tape, tax burden, and labor
regulations.
1  Given that our purpose here is to illustrate the regulatory regime’s overall,
reduced-form effect, we combine these regulation measures into a single index.
Specifically, we first standardize the indicators to range between 0 and 1 --where a higher
number indicates a heavier burden of the corresponding regulation--, and then we average
them out to obtain a single index.  Our sample consists of 76 countries, representing all
major regions of the world. To get a sense for the prevalence of regulations across
regions, Figure 1 presents the median of the regulatory index for various groups of
countries.  We can discern three levels of regulatory burden. Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR),
the Middle East and North Africa (MNA), Latin America (LAC), and South Asia (SAS)
have the highest level of regulatory burden.  East Asia and Pacific (EAP) is in the middle
of the range, and industrialized countries (INL) show the lowest level of overall
regulations.
2
                                                          
1 See the appendix for specific definitions, sources, and coverage of the data.
2 We should note that this pattern is not homogeneous across types of regulations. For instance,
contrary to the overall index, industrialized countries have the highest burden of taxation.6
The dependent variable in our analysis is the severity of recessions.  There is no
standard measure in the literature for this concept, but here we propose a simple
indicator. It captures the extent of downward output deviations from trend for each
country during a given period.  We first obtain output-gap series by detrending each
country’s (log) of per-capita GDP, using annual data for the period 1960-2000.  The
detrending procedure is conducted using the band-pass filter of Baxter and King (1999)
on a country-by-country basis.  We then identify and select only output gaps below trend.
Finally, the severity-of-recessions indicator for each country results from adding up its
recessionary gaps during the period 1990-2000.
The scatter plot in Figure 2 represents the simple relationship between the
regulation index and the severity of recessions. Confirming our priors, stronger
regulations are related to more severe recessions, with a correlation coefficient of 0.36.
A more formal evaluation of the connection between our variables of interest should take
into account the additional determinants of the severity of recessions.  In particular, it is
necessary to control for key shocks that can affect the economy and its downward cycles.
In particular, we consider the possibility that the severity of recessions is not only related
to regulations but also to the volatility of the terms of trade, the volatility of domestic
price inflation, and the degree of real exchange rate overvaluation. The first column of
Table 1 presents the OLS regression results. The estimated coefficient on the regulation
index is positive and statistically significant.
The OLS estimation results do not control for the possibility that the regulatory
burden be endogenously determined, along with the severity of recessions.  Given that we
are interested in the effect from regulations to recessions, we use an instrumental variable
procedure to isolate the impact of exogenous changes in the regulation index.  We select
the instrumental variables from the recent literature on the causes of regulations (see
Botero et al. 2003 and Bolaky and Freund 2004). They are the initial level of per capita
GDP and variables that indicate legal origin (British, French, German, Nordic) and
degree of Western influence in the country. The IV regression results are presented in the
second column of Table 1. Hansen’s J-test of over-identifying restrictions cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with the regression residual.
Moreover, the instruments have a large explanatory power over the regulatory index
(R
2=0.74).  Together, these results indicate that the instruments are valid and relevant.
Interestingly, the IV estimated coefficient on the regulation index is quite close to its
OLS counterpart in terms of sign, size, and statistical significance.
We can use the IV results to gauge a sense for the economic significance of the
effect of regulations on the severity of recessions. A simple exercise is to measure the
impact of reducing the regulation index from the heaviest to the least regulated regions.
In particular, consider reducing the regulation index from that of a typical or median
country in Africa, Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia (0.51) to that of the
median in developed countries (0.28).  Using the IV point estimate for the coefficient on
the regulation index (0.1), this reduction in the regulatory burden leads to lessening the
severity of recessions by 2.3 percentage points, which represents almost 30% of the
typical loss due to recessions in developing countries.7
3. A Theory of Plant Selection
We develop a general equilibrium model of heterogeneous production units or
“plants”, vintage capital, and common and idiosyncratic shocks, based on Hopenhayn
(1992) and Campbell (1998).  Assume that there exists a distribution of plants
characterized by different levels of productivity.  In each period, plant managers decide
whether to exit or stay in business.  If a plant stays, the manager must decide how much
labor to hire. If the plant exits, it is worth a sell-off value.  New technologies are
developed every period. Plants face three types of productivity shocks: an aggregate
shock common to all plants, an idiosyncratic (plant-specific) shock, and an innovation to
the leading-edge production technology.
In this context, the economy is characterized by an ongoing process of plant entry
and exit, with the corresponding job creation and destruction.  Plants exit if aggregate
economic prospects loom negative.  They may also exit if their current technology
becomes obsolete and, by selling their capital off, owners gain access to the leading-edge
technology –Schumpeter’s process of creative destruction.  However, exiting is costly as
capital loses some of its value in the process. These investment irreversibilities, as
modeled by Caballero and Engel (1999), combined with idiosyncratic uncertainty,
generate an equilibrium solution where plant owners rationally delay their exit decisions.
Our model extends Campbell’s (1998) analysis in three dimensions.  First, by
fully characterizing plant level dynamics, we consider starting and closing plants, as well
as incumbents. This allows us to look not only at plant entry and exit but also at labor
creation and destruction resulting from continuing plants.
Second, we consider both aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Within
this setting, plants can become more productive over time for two reasons: either they are
all exposed to better methods of production or some receive a good realization of
productivity improvement while others do not. The distinction is relevant since these
non-mutually exclusive ways of increasing productivity have different implications. In
particular, while aggregate productivity changes are unbounded and do not necessarily
entail substantial worker displacement, the increase in efficiency resulting from specific
shocks is bounded by the production possibilities frontier and may involve significant
reallocation of inputs across firms.  Moreover, while the former predicts a negative
correlation between entry and exit of plants (and corresponding labor creation and
destruction), the latter implies positive comovement between them.
Finally, we extend Campbell’s model to allow for exogenously imposed rigidities.
In particular, we study the effect of policies that alter firms’ decisions to leave or stay in
the market. In our benchmark simulations, markets are fully flexible. Thus policies that
alter the equilibrium reduce welfare. In particular, policies that subsidize incumbents
reduce the reallocation of resources that naturally follows a recession, delaying recovery.
Governments are willing to impose such policies to reduce the volatility and short run8
social and political costs associated to recessions. Our simulation results below are
consistent with this fact: as the reallocation process is muted, incumbent protection
reduces short run output losses at the cost of a slow recovery.
In order to better relate our model to the existing micro dynamics literature, we
refer to production units as “plants”.  We should make clear, however, that we do not
provide a theory of the firm or the plant.  In our model the size of the firm as a collection
of production units is indeterminate, and, therefore, the modeled entry-exit dynamics can
occur either within or across actual firms or plants.  Nevertheless, to the extent that firm
or plant activities tend to consist of interrelated production units (or investment projects),
we expect that there is considerable correlation between production dynamics in the
model and plant dynamics in reality.  Moreover, we conjecture that the magnitude of
entry and exit implicit in the model is an upper bound of those in reality. We come back
to this point when we discuss the parameterization of the model.
The gap between the definition of production units in the model and in the data
implies that our model abstracts from reality in other dimensions that are also relevant for
the specification of parameters as well as for the interpretation of our results. On the one
hand, only new plants invest. In the data investment is carried out by both new and old
plants. On the other hand, plants may adopt new technologies without actually closing.
In what follows we describe our model in detail.
The model economy: The economy is populated by a continuum of
heterogeneous plants. A plant needs labor (n) and capital (k) for production of the unique
good, which can be used for consumption or investment. This unique production good is
the numeraire.
Each plant's technology is given by
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where λt is the aggregate productivity shock common to all establishments and θt is the
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N(⋅) is the normal distribution, 0 ≤ ρλ ≤ 1,  and    λ εt  is i.i.d.
Each type of capital embodies different levels of technology. Since technologies
are characterized by constant returns to scale, we can restrict the size of all plants to be
equal to one unit of capital. Thus, capital goods are identified with plants so that
investing one unit of the aggregate good yields a unit mass of plants.9
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=  is the aggregate effective capital stock.
Capital embodying relatively low level of technology is scrapped as its
productivity lags behind that of the leading edge technology. When a plant is retired, a
unit of capital that is scrapped has salvage value s < 1. The total amount of salvaged
capital in period t is then
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where  t θ  is the endogenous cut-off level of productivity that determines the exit decision
of plants. Units of the production goods not consumed -- which are made up of
investment and part of last period’s scrapped capital --, are transformed into new units of
capital embodied with the leading edge technology. That is, the initial productivity level
of a plant born in period t is a random variable with a normal distribution  ( ) 2
t 1   , z N ~ σ θ + t ,
where zt is the index of embodied technology that represents the leading edge production
process. This random variable follows a random walk with a positive drift µz according to
( ) 2
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This drift is the only source of long-run aggregate growth in our economy.
Capital that is not scrapped receives an idiosyncratic shock to its productivity
level before next period production process starts, according to
( ) 2
1 1 1   0, N ~   , θ
θ θ σ ε ε θ θ + + + + = t t t t
This idiosyncratic shock has zero mean and thus, it does not affect the economy´s
long-run growth rate. The random walk property of the stochastic process ensures that the
differences in average productivity across units of capital persist over time. Thus, at any
t, the units of capital with more advanced technology have a lower probability of shutting
down.
Summarizing, there are three sources of uncertainty: First, an idiosyncratic
productivity shock,    θ
t e , that determines the plant level decisions of incumbents. This10
shock does not alter the aggregate equilibrium allocation. Second, an idiosyncratic
productivity shock,    z
t ε , that governs the economy wide growth. Notice that plants, as
they decide to stay or leave, choose between the following distributions:
( ) 2
t 1   , N ~ θ σ θ θ + t
( ) 2
t 1   , z N ~ σ θ + t
Finally, an aggregate shock,    λ
t e , that introduces aggregate uncertainty, moving
transitorily the economy´s production possibility frontier.
Plants last one period. At the beginning of the period, firms decide production and
hiring. The wage rate in period t is ωt , and the beginning and end of period prices of a
plant with productivity θt are   ( )  t
0 θ t q and  ( )  t
1 θ t q , respectively. Within this setting, given
the number of units of capital with productivity θt,  ()   t θ t k , the employment assigned to
each plant is given by
() t t t t K e N n t / θ α θ =
After production, firms decide which plants should be scrapped and which ones
should be maintained in business. Firms sell their production and salvaged capital to the
consumer and to a construction firm that produces capital embodying the leading edge
technology.








































Since asset prices equal discounted expected dividend streams, increases in the
level of productivity raise these prices; and since the scrap value of a plant is independent
of its productivity, only plants with productivity level below the threshold  t θ  exit the
market. The marginal plant, that is, the one with productivity level  t θ , has a market value
given by the scrap value. The following equation states this condition.
()   t
1 θ t q s =
Finally, the purchasing price of a unit of capital is determined not only by its
marginal productivity but also by the price at which the capital left after depreciation may11
be sold at the end of the period. Thus, for each θt, the purchase and sale decisions of
capital units must be characterized by the zero profit condition:
()( ) () {} {} ()  
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where 1{⋅} is an indicator function that equals one if its argument is true and zero
otherwise. This condition restricts the beginning of period price to be the return from
using the capital plus the price at which it can be sold at the end of the period.
There is a construction firm whose sole purpose is to incorporate the leading edge
technology into the goods produced by the firm. A construction firm which buys  c
t I  units
of the aggregate good from the producer incorporates the leading edge technology at zero
cost, and then sells it to consumers at the end of the period at a price per unit    1i
t q . Profit
maximization requires the price of the construction project to be equal to the cost of
inputs. That is,
  1 1 = i
t q .
Government subsidies - or taxes -, τt , follow an AR(1) process as the one
described for the aggregate productivity shock, λt. We consider policies that allow plants
to stay longer in the market than they would have without government intervention. We
represent them by a subsidy to incumbents that increases the end of period price of an old
plant. The government´s budget constraint is guaranteed to be satisfied by imposing a
lump-sum transfer to consumers.
The remainder of the model is standard. There is a continuum of identical
infinitely lived consumers who own labor and equity. Their preferences are given by
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where  ct  and 1 - nt are consumption and leisure respectively, and β  ∈ (0,1) is the
subjective time discount factor. Every period consumers have a time endowment equal to
1. Following Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), we assume that consumers can work a
fixed number of hours or none at all. To avoid non-convexities, consumers are assumed
to trade employment lotteries. As a consequence, nt is interpreted as the fraction of the
population that works.
Definition of the equilibrium: A Competitive Equilibrium in this economy is a
set of contingent plans {}
∞
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i
t t t t q q q ω  of labor, plants at the beginning of the period, plants at the end of
the period, and construction projects, and a vector {}
∞
=0 t t θ  such that, given contingent
prices, the transfer Tt , and production and government stochastic processes {zt, θt, λt, τ t},
at each period t:
1) The representative consumer solves
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2) The producer of the consumption good satisfies
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4) The government satisfies
()() t t t t t t T d k q = ∫
∞
∞ −
θ θ θ τ 1 1
5) The market clearing restriction is satisfied
t t t t S Y I c + = +
4. A Numerical Evaluation
We simulate the transitional path that follows aggregate productivity shocks. We
study slow recoveries resulting from distortions that alter plants dynamics. Although
these distortions may take various forms, we model a specific policy that subsidizes
incumbents. Plants that would have exited after the shock stay longer in the market when
the subsidy is positive. To approximate actual experiences we simulate equilibria for a
range of policy values.
Solution method
To solve for the numerical equilibria we use a three-step strategy. First, we
compute the non-stochastic steady state values for the model variables. Second, we
linearize the system of equations that characterize the solution around the long-run values
of the variables. Third, we apply the method of undetermined coefficients described in
Christiano (1998). To solve the model we scale the variables by the long-run growth rate
such that they converge to a steady state. Then, a mapping takes the solution from the
scaled objects solved for in the computations to the unscaled objects of interest.
Parameter values
We can separate the parameters in three types, given by the following vectors:
aggregate parameters { } λ λ ρ σ α µ γ δ β , , , , , , , s z ; plant specific parameters { } θ σ σ, ; and
policy parameters {} τ ρ τ σ τ , , .
The aggregate parameters are calibrated as in a representative firm economy. A
period is one quarter. Long-run growth is given by µz(1-α)/α, which also represents the
growth rate of income per capita since population is stationary. Thus, to have an annual
trend growth rate of 2%, and given α equal to 0.6 – a standard value in the literature-, we
use  µz equal to 0.52%. The marginal utility of leisure, γ, determines the fraction of
available time allocated to labor. We chose γ consistently with N equal to 0.35. The14
irreversibility s is fixed in 0.9. The remaining aggregate parameters, β, α, and δ, are
chosen as in the standard growth literature.
Plant specific parameters are taken from Campbell (1998). There are two reasons
to do so. First, long series of plant level data are generally not available for a large
sample of countries. Second, we see our economies as equal in all respect but policy. We
use the United States as our undistorted long-run benchmark.
Campbell (1998) sets parameter values to match the moments of plant dynamics
using data from the Annual Survey of Manufactures of the U.S. Department of Census.
Although we refer to production units as plants in our model, investment projects provide
a better description of them. Thus, an entry or an exit in the model might occur within an
actual plant, and thus might not be captured by actual data. In this sense, our model
naturally generates much more dynamics than that observed in the data. Nevertheless, our
parameterization underestimates the true variance of investment projects, as we match
our model's moments using plant level data. Had we used the variability of entry and exit
of projects across and within plants, our results would have assigned a much larger role to
reallocation and restructuring as a source of transitional growth.
Policy parameters are also complicated to calibrate since comparable series for
plant level distortions are typically not available across countries. Thus, we approximate
different actual experiences by simulating transitional growth using a wide range of
policy values. These distortions are intended to capture different regulations that reduce
competition, raise the costs of firm formation and slow down technological adoption.
They may also represent other impediments to the natural process of reallocation across
firms such as financial markets imperfections. In general, any policy that affects current
and expected productivity, interfering with the natural process of birth, growth, and death
of firms, will have a detrimental effect on aggregate growth. For instance, as the cost of
entering and exiting the economy changes, the distribution of firms is altered: too many
inefficient firms remain in the market and too few efficient firms enter the market. As a
result, both the reshuffling of resources from less to more efficient firms and the adoption
of the leading edge technology are impeded.  Our choices for the level of the subsidy
yield a government size between 18.2% and 23.7% in steady state. These figures are at
ranges within the lower bound of the distribution of actual government shares in GDP
(OECD 2003).
Finally, the remaining parameters, σλ, ρλ, στ and ρτ,  are picked along with our
simulation exercises; i.e., they are used to fix the size and persistence of the shocks
imposed on our simulated economies. Table 2  summarizes our parameter choices.
Simulating transitional growth
Our benchmark equilibrium is given by an economy without distortions that faces
an exogenous 5% reduction in its aggregate productivity level (i.e., σλ=-0.05). This shock15
has no persistence (i.e., ρλ=0), and thus it lasts only one period. We make the latter
assumption to abstract from the intertemporal effects of the shock.
Figure 3 shows the impulse responses for four key macroeconomic elements of
the benchmark equilibrium: output, consumption, investment and hours worked. We see
that, as expected, a negative aggregate shock to productivity reduces all of them. These
impulse responses are consistent with those observed in a representative firm economy. A
model with plant heterogeneity introduces and additional margin by allowing entry and
exit and reshuffling of resources across existing plants. These reallocation effects are
relevant for aggregate productivity dynamics. Figures 4 and 5 show impulse responses
for the cut-off level of productivity that determines endogenous exit decisions, and job
creation and destruction rates, respectively. A one period reduction in the level of
aggregate productivity increases the cut-off level of productivity since it forces relatively
inefficient plants to exit. Moreover, job creation falls and job destruction increases. The
aggregate labor response is the net result of these two margins of adjustment.
To study differences in recovery paths we analyze two particular cases of
impediments to reallocation that might shed light on actual differences in recovery paths.
In the first numerical exercise, we compare economies that start-off with different levels
of a production subsidy to incumbent firms. We then expose these economies to the same
5% aggregate shock, and compare their recovery paths to their own trend. The second
exercise simulates an economy with no distortions that imposes a transitory subsidy to
incumbents a period after the aggregate shock occurs. When the exogenous recession hits
the economy, jobs are lost and production units are scrapped. To reduce the distress
associated to these losses, the government intervenes subsidizing incumbents one period
after the shock hits the economy. This policy is short lived, as it follows an AR(1) with
autocorrelation coefficient of 0.66; that is, it lasts about 3 quarters.
3
Figure 6 shows the recovery path for our first exercise. The trend has been
normalized to one in both economies. Initially, the economy that protects incumbents
experiments a smaller fall in output. This is precisely why this type of policies are
typically implemented: to reduce volatility. Over time, however, the protected economy
experiments a slow recovery. The results are similar in the second exercise. Figure 7
shows the recovery path in this case. As before, the economy that subsidizes existing
plants experiences stagnating growth and recovers its pre crisis output trend level much
later.
To measure the differences in the recovery paths of the undistorted and distorted
economies, we provide two types of indicators. The first type relates to the size of output
losses, whereas the second to the time that output takes to recover its long-run trend.
To construct the first indicator (from now on, the loss), we start by normalizing
the path of output and its trend in such a way that all economies start off with the same
level of output; that is, GDP per capita and its trend at time t = 0 are all equal to 1. We do
                                                          
3 Our exercise is highly stylized since the endogeneous policy response is more likely to happen
in reality when aggregate shocks are persistent.16
this to account for the fact that distorted economies have lower output in steady state. Let
Y
τ
t represent the actual GDP of the economy with distortion at level τ in period t, and let
YT
τ
t  be its trend. Thus, the loss is the present value of output deviations from its trend as













We use two sets of recovery length indicators. The first one measures the time it
takes the economy to recover its trend after the economy is struck by the exogenous
aggregate shock. The second indicator is the fraction of the loss that is realized in a given
number of quarters.
Table 3 reports these indicators for the simulated economies. The fully flexible
economy loses a significant fraction of its pre-crisis GDP over the recovery path: 13.1%
in present value terms. The economy does not recover instantaneously because there exist
technological rigidities – a scrap value below 1, and a lag between investment decisions
and its availability for production. These rigidities imply that the loss of output is larger
than the actual shock.  If the economy is already distorted when the shock strikes, the loss
increases to slightly over 14%. This difference, about a 1% of pre-crisis GDP, is totally
due to reduced reallocation, and thus to lower aggregate TFP growth. Recall that we
measure the loss after normalizing the path of output, so the loss does not incorporate the
fact that the distorted economy is poorer in steady-state.  This additional loss is large. The
measured losses associated to the subsidy that is given right after the crisis starts are
much larger (first line of the second panel.) Their larger size is due to the fact that the tax
puts the economy below its trend for a long period of time (see Figure 7).
The second measure shows that the undistorted economy quickly recovers its
output trend: it takes only 1 quarter to reduce the gap to less than one fifth of a one
percent
4. The subsidized economies take 9 and 10 quarters, respectively. The length of
the recovery period increases substantially when the government subsidizes firms right
after the crisis has started, with catch-up periods that rise over 30 quarters. Thus the
policy intervention reduces volatility and firm destruction, at the cost of a long period of
stagnation.
Our final measure, the fraction of the loss that is realized in 1, 5, 10, 20 and 30
quarters, is reported at the bottom of each panel. Most of the loss is quickly realized in
the fully flexible economy, with over 84% of it happening within the first period.
Subsidized economies spread these losses over time, with 68% to 72% realized within the
first quarter. Only after 10 quarters all three simulated economies behave similarly,
having realized about 95% of the loss. Once again, the differences with the economy that
is intervened during the crisis are striking: only 30% to 46% of the loss is realized within
                                                          
4 The size of this lag depends crucially on our one quarter time-to-build assumption.17
the first quarter, spreading the recovery path over a much longer period of time. The
economy takes about 30 quarters to realize 95% of the loss, i.e., 5 years more than the
undistorted economy.
Our results show that the costs associated to incumbent protection are substantial,
both in terms of lost output and recovery length. These costs are much larger whenever
the economy is distorted along the recovery path, because within a short period of time,
the economy faces two shocks: the exogenous aggregate shock and the policy response to
the shock. If the government lets the economy adjust on its own, the initial fall in output
is much sharper, but concentrated over a significantly shorter period of time.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have linked microeconomic rigidities to aggregate transitional
growth. By subsidizing incumbents, we have altered the reallocation process, a key
source of aggregate efficiency. As plants that would have exited the economy stay longer
in the market, aggregate efficiency lowers and growth stagnates. As a result, economies
experience slow recoveries and large output losses.
Our findings are consistent with observed recovery paths. The evidence on plant
dynamics across countries is also consistent with our findings. Developing and developed
economies show surprisingly similar rates of job reallocation, although output volatility is
markedly higher in poor countries. This high volatililty suggests the need for higher
restructuring. Thus the evidence is consistent with sluggish restructuring in developing
countries, perhaps as a result of institutional impediments to resource mobility across
production units. Governments are willing to impose these rigidities to reduce the
deepness of recessions and the associated short run social and political costs. However,
reduced volatility comes at the cost of stagnation and increased output losses in the long
run.
Finally, our results suggest further research on other growth-related issues.
Market oriented reforms have been ubiquitously undertaken during the last two decades.
However, most reforms are implemented sequentially, so when one reform is undertaken
other obstacles to reallocation stay in place. Our results suggest that the benefits from
liberalizing international trade or from privatizing publicly owned firms will be largely
reduced if impediments to plant dynamics are not eliminated simultaneously.18
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(name in our database) Scale Description Years Sources
Number of procedures
(db_entry_proc)
Actual number The number of different procedures that a start-up has to
comply with in order to obtain a legal status, i.e. to start
operating as a legal entity. The data cover (1) procedures
that are always required; (2) procedures that are generally
required but that can be avoided in exceptional cases or for








Actual number Time recorded in calendar days. It is assumed that the
minimum time required to fulfill a procedural requirement is
one day. The variable measures the average duration
estimated necessary to complete a procedure. The fastest
procedure (independent of cost) is chosen. It is assumed
that the entrepreneur completes the procedure in the most









% GNI Costs associated with starting-up a business, based on the
texts of the Company Law, the Commercial Code, or
specific regulations. If there are conflicting sources and the
laws are not completely clear, the most authoritative source
is used. If the sources have the same rank the source
indicating the most costly procedure is used. In the absence
of express legal fee schedules, a governmental officer’s
estimate is taken as an official source. If several sources
have different estimates, the median reported value is used.
In the absence of government officer's estimates, estimates
of incorporation lawyers are used instead. If these differ, the







Doing Business - The World Bank Group - Starting a
Business
see Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, "The Regulation of Entry",
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 1-37, Feb. 2002.
http://rru.worldbank.org/doingbusiness
1 Very low Existing regulations straightforward and applied uniformly to
all businesses; regulations not much of a burden for
business; corruption nearly nonexistent.
2 Low Simple licensing procedures; existing regulations relatively
straightforward and applied uniformly most of the time, but
burdensome in some instances; corruption possible but rare
3 Moderate Complicated licensing procedure; regulations impose
substantial burden on business; existing regulations may be
applied haphazardly and in some instances are not even
published by the government; corruption may be present
and poses minor burden on businesses
4 High Government-set production quotas and some state
planning; major barriers to opening a business; complicated
licensing process; very high fees; bribes sometimes
necessary; corruption present and burdensome; regulations
impose a great burden on business
Entry regulation
(ief_regulation)
5 Very high Government impedes the creation of new businesses;
corruption rampant; regulations applied randomly
1995-2003
(annual)
The Index of Economic Freedom - Heritage
Foundation
Based on: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce and
Country Report ,2001 and 2002;U.S. Department of State,
Country Commercial Guide 24 and Country Reports on
Economic Policy and Trade Practices for 2000;Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative,2002 National Trade Estimate Report on






(name in our database) Scale Description Years Sources
1 Very low Weighted average tariff rate less than or equal to 4 percent.
2 Low Weighted average tariff rate greater than 4 percent but less
than or equal to 9 percent
3 Moderate Weighted average tariff rate greater than 9 percent but less
than or equal to 14 percent
4 High Weighted average tariff rate greater than 14 percent but less
than or equal to 19 percent
Trade
(ief_trade)
5 Very high Weighted average tariff rate greater than 19 percent.
1995-2003
(annual)
The Index of Economic Freedom - Heritage
Foundation
Based on: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report and
Country Commerce, 2002; International Monetary Fund,
Government Finance Statistics Yearbook and International
Financial Statistics on CD–ROM, 2002; Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, 2002 National Trade Estimate Report on
Foreign Trade Barriers; U.S. Department of State, Country
Commercial Guide 3 and Country Reports on Economic Policy
and Trade Practices for 2001 and 2002; World Bank, World
Development Indicators 2002; World Trade Organization, Trade
Policy Reviews, 1995 to June 2001; and official government
publications of each country. For all the European Union
countries, the authors have based the score on data reported by
the World Bank.




0  to 10 No barriers other than published tariffs and quotas.




0  to 10 The combined effect of import tariffs, license fees, bank
fees, and the time required for administrative red-tape raises
costs of importing equipment by (10 = 10% or less; 0 = more
than 50%). This component is based on survey responses





Economic Freedom of the World - The Fraser Institute
From section:
4 Freedom to Exchange with Foreigners
B. Regulatory Trade Barriers
Based on:  World Economic Forum (2001), Global






(name in our database) Scale Description Years Sources
iv. Avoidance of interest
rate controls and
regulations that lead to




0  to 10 Data on credit-market controls and regulations were used to
construct rating intervals. Countries with interest rates
determined by the market, stable monetary policy, and
positive real deposit and lending rates received higher
ratings. When interest rates were determined primarily by
market forces and the real rates were positive, countries
were given a rating of 10. When interest rates were primarily
market-determined but the real rates were sometimes
slightly negative (less than 5%) or the differential between
the deposit and lending rates was large (8% or more),
countries received a rating of 8. When the real deposit or
lending rate was persistently negative by a single-digit
amount or the differential between them was regulated by
the government, countries were rated at 6. When the deposit
and lending rates were fixed by the government and the real
rates were often negative by single-digit amounts, countries
were assigned a rating of 4. When the real deposit or
lending rate was persistently negative by a double-digit
amount, countries received a rating of 2. A zero rating was
assigned when the deposit and lending rates were fixed by
the government and real rates were persistently negative by
double-digit amounts or hyperinflation had virtually




Economic Freedom of the World - The Fraser Institute
5: Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business
A. Credit Market Regulations
Based on: International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics Yearbook (various issues, as well as the monthly
supplements)
v. Interest rate controls:
interest rate controls on
bank deposits and/or loans





0  to 10 Data provided by the World Economic Forum.
1 Very low Government involvement in the financial sector negligible;
very few restrictions on foreign financial institutions; banks
may engage in all types of financial services
2 Low Government involvement in the financial sector minimal; few
limits on foreign banks; country may maintain some limits on
financial services; domestic bank formation may face some
barriers
3 Moderate Substantial government influence on banks; government
owns or controls some banks; government controls credit;
domestic bank formation may face significant barriers
4 High Heavy government involvement in the financial sector;
banking system in transition; banks tightly controlled by




5 Very high Financial institutions in chaos; banks operate on primitive
basis; most credit controlled by government and goes only
to state-owned enterprises; corruption rampant
1995-2003
(annual)
The Index of Economic Freedom - Heritage
Foundation
Based on: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce,
Country Profile, and Country Report for 2001 and 2002; U.S.
Department of State, Country Commercial Guide 19 ; U.S.
Department of State, Country Reports on Economic Policy and





(name in our database) Scale Description Year Sources
Number of procedures
(db_contr_proc)
Actual number Number of procedures mandated by law or court regulation
that demands interaction between the parties or between
them and the judge or court officer. The questionnaire
covers the step-by-step evolution of a debt recovery case






Doing Business - The World Bank Group – Contract
Enforcement
see Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-




0 to 4 High points are given to countries where the bureaucracy
has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic
changes in policy or interruptions in government services.
Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong
bureaucracy receive low points because a change in
government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy
formulation and day-to-day administrative functions.





(name in our database) Scale Description Years Sources
Individual income tax grading scale
1 Very low Top income tax rate 0 percent. Marginal rate for the average
taxpayer 0 percent.
2 Low Top income tax rate greater than 0 percent and less than or
equal to 25 percent. Marginal rate for the average taxpayer
greater than 0 percent and less than or equal to 10 percent
3 Moderate Top income tax rate greater than 25 percent and less than
or equal to 35 percent. Marginal rate for the average
taxpayer greater than 10 percent and less than or equal to
15 percent.
4 High Top income tax rate greater than 35 percent and less than
or equal to 50 percent. Marginal rate for the average
taxpayer greater than 15 percent and less than or equal to
20 percent.
5 Very high Top income tax rate greater than 50 percent. Marginal rate
for the average taxpayer greater than 20 percent
Corporate tax grading scale
1 Very low Corporate tax rate less than or equal to 20 percent
2 Low Corporate tax rate greater than 20 percent and less than or
equal to 25 percent
3 Moderate Corporate tax rate greater than 25 percent and less than or
equal to 35 percent.
4 High Corporate tax rate greater than 35 percent and less than or
equal to 45 percent.
Fiscal burden
(ief_taxation)
5 Very high Corporate tax rate greater than 45 percent.
1995-2003
(annual)
The Index of Economic Freedom - Heritage
Foundation
Based on: Ernst & Young, 2002 The Global Executive and 2002
Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide; International Monetary Fund
Staff Country Report, Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix,
2000 to 2002; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce,
Country Profile, and Country Report for 2001 and 2002; U.S.
Department of State, Country Commercial Guide 9 ; and official
government publications of each country. Sources other than
Ernst & Young are noted in the text. For information on
government expenditures, the authors’ primary sources were
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development data
(for member countries); International Monetary Fund,
Government Finance Statistics Yearbook for 2001, and
International Monetary Fund Staff Country Report, Selected
Issues and Statistical Appendix, 2000 to 2002; Standard &
Poor’s, Sovereigns Ratings Analysis; Asian Development Bank,
Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 2001;
African  Development Bank, ADB Statistics Pocketbook 2002;
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,  Country
Strategies; Inter- American Development Bank; U.S.
Department of State, Country Commercial Guide 10 ; and
official government publications of each country. Sources other
than the OECD and the IMF are noted in the text.25
Government expenditures scale for developed countries
1 Very low Less than or equal to 15 percent.
2 Low Greater than 15 percent but less than or equal to 25 percent
3 Moderate Greater than 25 percent but less than or equal to 35 percent
4 High Greater than 35 percent but less than or equal to 45 percent
5 Very high Greater than 45 percent
Government expenditures scale for developing
countries
1 Very low Less than or equal to 15 percent
2 Low Greater than 15 percent but less than or equal to 20 percent.
3 Moderate Greater than 20 percent but less than or equal to 25 percent
4 High Greater than 25 percent but less than or equal to 30 percent
5 Very high Greater than 30 percent
Corporate tax %
(kpmg_tax)
% rate Corporate tax rate. The above rates do not reflect payroll
taxes, social security taxes, net wealth taxes, turnover/sales
taxes and other taxes not levied on income.




Corporate Tax Rates Survey - KPMG, Switzerland
The survey (begun in 1993) currently covers 68 countries,
including the 30 member countries of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and many
countries in the Asia Pacific and Latin America regions.
http://www.kpmg.com




0 to 10 Average of 1.D.i. Top Marginal Income Tax Rate and 1.D.ii.
Top Marginal Income and Payroll Tax Rate
Countries with higher marginal tax rates that take effect at
lower income thresholds received lower ratings. The income
threshold data were converted from local currency to
1982/1984 US dollars (using beginning-of-year exchange




Economic Freedom of the World - The Fraser Institute





(name in our database) Scale Description Years Sources
TUMMBR
(ra_union)
% Total trade union membership, in percent of the total labor
force. Includes workers of both sexes in the public and the
private sectors. In some countries, the union membership
may include unemployed and retired workers who pay their
dues. Based on the number of active contributors declared
by the trade unions themselves and on labor force
estimates.  When declared membership is larger than the
labor force, a 100 percent membership rate is reported.
1945-2000
(5 year)
A Database of Labor-Market Indicators Across Countries
M. Rama and R. Artecona, The World Bank, 2002.
Flexibility-of-hiring index
(db_flex_hiring)
0 to 100, higher values
indicating more rigid
regulation





Doing Business - The World Bank - Hiring and Firing
Workers
see Botero Juan, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, "The Regulation of
Labor", Working Paper 9756, National Bureau of Economic
Research, June 2003
Based on: NATLEX database (International Labor
Organization); Constitutions, available online on the U.S. Law
Library of Congress website; International Encyclopaedia for
Labor Law and Industrial Relations, and Social Security
Programs Throughout the World. Legal advice from leading
local law firms was solicited to confirm accuracy in all cases.
Following the OECD Job Study and the International
Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, the
areas subject to statutory regulation in all countries were26
Conditions-of-employment
index (db_cond_empl)
0 to 100, higher values
indicating more rigid
regulation
Covers working time requirements, including mandatory
minimum daily rest, maximum number of hours in a normal
workweek, premium for overtime work, restrictions on
weekly holiday, mandatory payment for nonworking days,
(which includes days of annual leave with pay and paid time
off for holidays), and minimum wage legislation. The
constitutional principles dealing with the minimum conditions








0 to 100, higher values
indicating more rigid
regulation
Covers workers' legal protections against dismissal,
including grounds for dismissal, procedures for dismissal
(individual and collective), notice period, and severance
payment. The constitutional principles dealing with









(name in our database) Scale Description Year Sources
Goals-of-insolvency index
(db_close_insolv)
0 to 100 The measure documents the success in reaching the three
goals of insolvency, as stated in Hart (1999). It is calculated
as the simple average of the cost of insolvency (rescaled
from 0 to 100, where higher scores indicate less cost), time
of insolvency (rescaled from 0 to 100, where higher scores
indicate less time), the observance of absolute priority of
claims, and the efficient outcome achieved. A score 100 on




% Cost is defined as the cost of the entire bankruptcy process,
including court costs, insolvency practitioners' costs, the
cost of independent assessors, lawyers, accountants, etc. In
all cases, the cost estimate excludes bribes. The cost
figures are averages of the estimates in a multiple-choice
question, where the respondents choose among the
following options: 0-2 percent, 3-5 percent, 6-10 percent, 11-





0 to 100 The measure documents the degree to which the court
drives insolvency proceedings. It is an average of three
indicators: whether the court appoints and replaces the
insolvency administrator with no restrictions imposed by law,
whether the reports of the administrator are accessible only
to the court and not creditors, and whether the court decides
on the adoption of the rehabilitation plan. The index is
scaled from 0 to 100, where higher values indicate more
court involvement in the insolvency process.
2003
Doing Business - The World Bank - Closing a Business
see Djankov, Simeon, Oliver Hart, Tatiana Nenova, and Andrei
Shleifer, "Efficiency in Bankruptcy", working paper, Department




(name in our database) Scale Description Year Sources
Corruption
(icrg_corrup)
0 to 6 This is an assessment of corruption within the political
system. The most common form of corruption met directly by
business is financial corruption in the form of demands for
special payments and bribes connected with import and
export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police
protection, or loans. The measure takes such corruption into
account, but it is more concerned with actual or potential
corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job
reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, and




0 to 6 The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength
and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-
component is an assessment of popular observance of the
law.  Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating – 3 – in terms
of its judicial system, but a low rating  - 1 – if it suffers from a





0 to 6 Measure of the government's responsiveness to the people.
The score depends on the type of regime: Alternating
Democracy, Dominated Democracy, De-facto One-party
State, or De-jure One-party State. Higher points are given to
Alternating Democracies (see ICRG for details).
1990-2000
International Country Risk Guide - PRS Group










We apply the following standardization formula to each component described above:
          (Xi-Xmin)/ (Xmax-Xmin) if higher values indicate heavier regulation and
          (Xmax-Xi)/ (Xmax-Xmin) if lower values indicate heavier regulation.
Therefore, all values are distributed between 0 and 1, with higher values denoting heavier regulation.
Next we take the simple average of the components in each category to get the corresponding partial indicator.  The overall index on
regulatory burden is the simple average of the partial indicators.28
Table 1. Severity of Recessions and the Burden of Regulations      
Sample: 76 countries, 1990 - 2000 
OLS IV
[1] [2]
Regulation index 0.09845 0.10021
  (index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher meaning more regulated) 2.54 2.18
Control Variables:
Volatility of terms of trade shocks 0.00089 0.00087
  (standard deviation of annual terms of trade growth) 0.77 0.74
Volatility of domestic inflation 0.00046 0.00045
  (standard deviation of annual CPI growth) 1.56 1.59
Real exchange rate overvaluation 0.01203 0.01213
  (proportional index, where overvaluation if index>100) 0.85 0.89
R-squared 0.19 0.19
R-squared 1st stage (partial due to excluded instruments) 0.74
SPECIFICATION TEST 
 Hansen's J-test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value): 0.93
Notes: 
a) Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity (Newey-West).
b) t-Statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficient.
c) Intercept is included in all estimations but not reported.
d) Instruments: log of per capita GDP in 1990, binary variables indicating legal origin (British,
   French, German, Nordic), variables indicating fraction of population that speaks a major 
   European language.
Source: Authors' estimation
Dependent variable: 
Severity of recessions: Sum of (log) per capita output gap below trend over 1990-200029
Table 2. Parameterization
Aggregate parameters
Discount factor β 0.98
Fraction of hours worked in steady state N 0.35
Labor share α 0.6
Technology drift µz 0.0052
Irreversibility s 0.9
Depreciation rate δ 0.02
Plant level parameters
Standard deviation of shock to incumbents σθ 0.03
Standard deviation of shock to startups σ 0.25
Simulation parameters
Aggregate productivity shock σλ -0.05
Aggregate  productivity shock persistence ρλ 0
Policy level
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Policy shock persistence ρτ
    Exercise 1





Loss (% of pre-shock GDP) 13.1 14.2 14.3
Catching up with the trend (quarters) 0.2% 1 9 10
0.5% 1 2 4
% of the loss realized in 1 quarter 84.2 72.3 68.1
5 quarters 91.1 88.7 90.1
10 quarters 94.5 94.9 96.5
20 quarters 97.8 98.9 99.6
30 quarters 99.1 99.8 100.0
Distortion along the way
036
Loss 13.1 23.7 36.3
Catching up with the trend (quarters) 0.2% 1 29 37
0.5% 1 17 26
% of the loss realized in 1 quarter 84.2 46.4 30.3
5 quarters 91.1 57.2 43.6
10 quarters 94.5 71.9 63.5
20 quarters 97.8 88.9 86.0
30 quarters 99.1 95.6 94.6
Subsidy (%)
Table 3. Simulated Slow Recovery Indicators
Subsidy (%)31








































































Figure 3. Impulse Response for Macro Variables

































Figure 4. Impulse Response for Cut-Off Level













Figure 5. Impulse Response for Job Creation and Destruction Rates





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿ Tau 6% Trend